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SUPPLEMENTAL - RELIST for 1/21/72

DISCUSS

No, 71-496
Ward v. Village of Monroeville
Cert to the Supreme Court of Ohio
You joined Brennan's PC at the Conference on 1/14/72.
Rehnquist has now circulated a dissent.

Rehnquist does not

disagree with Brennan's disposition on the merits; instead, he
counsels against summary disposition, albeit in a rather strange

Rehnquist argues that Brennan's PC "casts serious doubt on the
validity of the tens of thousands of courts similar to that of
Monroeville throughout the country."

This is at best an unverified

assumption; they have no figures regarding the number of such
'---r

courts in the US, and I am not sure that having this case argued
will shed much light on this,

There has been a tendency away

from the "fee" system of handling minor traffic offenses in this
country; in any event I am skeptical that there are more than

20,000 such courts around.

In any event, I do not understand how

the practical impact of Brennan's PC in any way detracts from

-

the conclusion that due process requires a judge who has no ini\:erest
in seeing that convictions are obtained, ,
Rehnquist argues that 1ffiX Brennan's decision will spawn
litigation in the form of collateral attacks on prior convictions.
Of course this will be equally true if the Court reaches the same
conclusion after argument.
Rehnquist also argues that the decision fails to offer "any
sure guide as to just when a local magistrate is, and when he is
not, constitutionally disqualified."

But this problem is inherent

in the nature of case-by-case adjudication; indeed, it arises in
no small part from the Constitutional requirement of a "case or
controversy" as a predicate for adjudication,

Perhaps, however,

this concern over the1 scope of Brennan's opinion, or the constitutional test involved, will cause Brennan to refine his opinion
a bit.
I doubt that having the case argued could effect a determination
on the merits of this case.

Argument might present considerations

that would assist the Court in drawing the appropriate lines, but
I doubt it.

One of the hazards of broad line-drawing is that you

inevitably decide cases which are neither presented nor contemplated,
The test which Rehnquist criticizes is not a new one; Brennan
merely restates verbatim the rule of Tumey Y..!. Ohio, 273 US 510 (1927).
This proposed decision should therefore cast no more doubt on "the
validity of the tens of thousands of courts similar" than did Tumey
when it was decided 35 years ago.

No new law is being articulated;

the principles of Tumey are merely being applied to a different
factual situation.
NO REASON FOR YOU TO CHANGE YOUR VOTE.
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Re: No. 71-496 Ward v. Village of Monroeville
Dear Bill:
Please join me in your opinion (second draft).
Although not of great importance, it occurs to me that the
word 'necessarily" - as used in the next to the bottom line on page 3 may overstate the situation, especially in this ease where the Mayor
in fact does not function as a normal chief executive mtmicipal officer.
I think I would substitute "may" for ''necessarily", although I am
content to leave this to you.
Sincerely,

:M r. .Justice Brennan

cc: The Conference

·•

•

I

j;uprrntc (4curt cf tip• 'Pttitc~ ~tatc.a-

'J!tinafri1tgton. p. ~- 20.;ni,3
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS

October 27, 1972

.

'..
'

·'

Dear Bill:
,'

In No. 71-496 - Ward v. Monroeville,
please join me.

.

W. O. D.

";~

Mr. Justice Brennan
cc: Conference

•.
..

l

/

I

'

~nvrmt.t <qc-urt of t4t 'J!lttitt~ ~huts
~aslpttghm. J.

<q. 21lffeJ.J,~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

October 27, 1972

Re:

No. 71-496

-

Ward v. Village of Monroeville

Dear Bill:

Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan
'

cc:

The Conference

I!
t'

'·.

,-

.

.:%upumt <!tcttrt cf tl7t Jtnit.dt .§tab's
~aslringfott. gl. (!J. 21J&,)t.~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

October 27, 1972

Re: No. 71-496, Ward v. Monroeville
Dear Bill,
I am in basic agreement with your opinion for the
Court in this case. I do, however, have some suggestions,
perhaps because as a former Ohioan I am quite sensitive to
the considerable impact this decision will have upon hundreds
of villages throughout the State:
(1) I think it is important to make clear that we
are talking here only about adjudication and punishment in a
litigated case where there is a not guilty plea. I would certainly not disqualify the mayor or any other village official
from acting in a quasi-clerical capacity where there is a free
and voluntary guilty or nolo plea, forfeiture of collateral, or
the like.

,·,

,....

,.

(2) I think it might be well to mention at the top of
page 3 that there were dissenters from the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Ohio.
(3) I think it is not accurate to say in the second
sentence of the first full paragraph on page 4 that the Mayor
of Xenia, in the Dugan case, "had no executive but only judicial functions. " As indeed you indicate in the balance of that
paragraph, the Mayor, as a rp.ember of the commission, had
both legislative and executive powers.
Sincerely yours,
Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

,_'.,

<!Jou.rt o-f tltt ~ttittb ~tatt.s- .
Jfasqingfou, ~- QJ. 2llffe~~

~tqrrtmt

CHAMBERS OF

JusT,cE wM . J . BRENNAN, JR.

October 27, 1972

RE: No. 71-496, Ward v. Village of
Monroeville
Dear Lewis:
Thank you so much for your
suggestion that I change "necessarily"
to "may" in the next to the bottom line
on page 3. I am making the change because you are indeed right.
Sincerely,

4,J
Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

j;u.µrrmt <!toutt cf tl7 e';nnitc~ ..§frtks
~a.slrington, ~. <q. 2.0giJt~
CHAMBERS OF

October 30, 1972

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

,

'

Re:

No. 71-496 - Ward v. Monroeville, Ohio

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

-viT.M.
Mr. Justice Brennan

cc:

~--

Conference

"
.... : 1

,.

~u:.puuu QJ:cnrt cf tlrt 'Jjlnittb ~htltg
~a:sJri:ttg-fott. 10. QJ:. 2llffeJ!,;l
CHAM BER S OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUI S T

/

November 1, 1972
',·.

Re:

No. 71-496 - Ward v. Village of Monroeville

Dear Byron:
Please join me in your dissent. Since I am withdrawing
my proposed concurrence, your reference to it is no longer
necessary.

Sincerely:r

Mr. Justice White
Copies to Conference

'·

$>u.t,trtutt ~irurt irf t~t 'Jffnittb ~htlts
'Jlihtslp:11:ghm. ~- ~- 2llpJ.l.~

j

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

November 1, 1972

Re:

,.
'

No. 71-496 - Ward v. Village of Monroeville

Dear Chief:
I wish to withdraw the concurring opinion circulated by
me on October 30th in this case; I intend to join the
dissenting opinion which Byron drafted.
/
Sincerely,

• ~ j'

r

The Chief Justice
Copies to Conference
,,

•

I

.....

$5u:pumt (!Jou.rt of tfrt :!Jlnittb .:§tatta
'Jm)'~afri:ttgfon, 1B. QJ. :WffeJ!..;t
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

November 2, 1972

Re: No. 71-496 - Ward v. Village of Monroeville

Dear Bill:
The exchange of memos flushes out (as John
Harlan used to put it) aspects of this case that I confess
I had not fully considered. Potter 1 s memo, for example,
gives rise to the question whether a judicial officer,
disqualified because of inherent conflict of interest, may
take a guilty plea. · In a major case such as a felony this
would give me some problems; it may be appropriate as
a practical matter for traffic violations, etc.
I wonder if this aspect should be treated.
Regards,

Mr. Justice Brennan

cc: The Conference

'

I'

;§uµrtmt <q:oud of tfrt 'Jllnitta ;§mug
~aglp:ngton. J:9. <q:. 2ll.;i'l-.;t
CHAMBER~ OP'

THE CHIEF" .JUSTICE

November 7, 1972

Re:

No. 71-496 - Ward v. Village of Monroeville, Ohio

Dear Bill:
This will confirm my joining your opinion in
the above.
Regards,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

/

THE C. J.

W. 0. D.

.

~~~e
,, /,},~

Q

.. J...1 ,,,,,

-

-

-

P. S.

W. J. B.

B. R. W .

PC 10/ 24/72

.J~~ ·~~-;

J~c~

~

16)2,

h

~»j

14

Jj j,-.,,,
I

T. l\1.

H . A. B.

...

~@
',/~,/,-v
.

L. F. P.

.

W. H . R.

,i,._;.

~ ½~
,. 1~,J-,-v- -.- -1.
,lt;,. ~
~ p

.

~ ~

r1- 1\ -- ._
.I. \ .J~

.

-

~
1 - ......
V

13,e (J

~,

~~
....

...

.. . --

, 0 ha.-'
II I

71-496 V ard v. Villa1 e of Monroev ille

To: The Chief Justice
Mr . Justice Douglas
Mr. Justice Stewart
Mr . Justice Whitn
Mr. Justice ~arshall
M
y. Justice Blackmun
v,ar . Justice Powell
Mr- Justi~ Rehnquist

From: Brennan, J.
irculated: \0

2nd DRAFT

{'vb /J~

-

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATEi

!3e~re~i~t~~; _ _.. . . ..........

.i:---

No. 71-406
Clarence Ward, Petitioner,
V.

Village of Monroeville,
Ohio.

On Writ of Certiorari to the
Supreme Court of Ohio.

f November - , 1972]
MR J U S'l'ICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of theCourt.
Pursuant to Ohio Revised Code § 1905.01 et seq., which
authorizes mayors to sit as judges in cases of ordinance
violations and certain traffic offenses, the Mayor of
Monroeville, Ohio, convicted petitioner of two traffic
offenses and fin ed him $50 on each. The Ohio Court of
Appeals of Huron County, 21 Ohio App. 2d 17, 254
N. E. 2d 375 (1969) , and the Ohio Supreme Court, 27
Ohio St. 2d 179, 271 N. E. 2d 757 (1971) , sustain ed the
conviction, rejecting petitioner's objection that trial be-fore a mayor who also had responsibilities for revenue
production and law enforcement denied him a trial before
a disinterested and impartial judicial officer as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. We granted certiorari. 404 U. S. 1058( 1972).
The Mayor of Monroeville has wide executive powers
and is the chief conservator of the peace. He is president of the village council, presides at all meetings, votes
in case of a tie, accounts annually to the council respecting
village finances, fills vacancies in village offices and has
general overall supervision of village a.ff airs. A major
part of village income is derived from the fines, forfeitures, costs and fees imposed by him in his mayor's court.

71-495-OPINION
2

WAHD v. VILLAGE OF MONROEVII,Ll•:

Thus in 1964, this income contributed $23,589.50 of
total village revenues of $46.3,55.38; in 1965 it was
$18,508.95 of $46,752.60; in 1966 in was $16,085 of
$43,585.13; in 1967 it was $20,060.65 of $53,931.43; and
in 1968 it was $23,429.42 of $52,995.95. This revenue
was of such importance to the village that when legislation threatened its loss, the village retained a management consultant for advice upon the problem."·
iC·Ordinanrr No. 59-9:
"WHEREAS, the legislation known as the County Court law
passrd by thr 102nd Ge1wral A~srmhl~· grratly reduces thr jurisdictional powrrs of l\foror Courts ns of .Tanuary 1, 1960; and
"WI-IF.RF.AS, Ruch restrir1ions ma~· plare such a hard~hip upon
hw enforcement per~onnel in this village :md f'urrounding areas as
to endangrr the health, wclfarp and ~nfety of pcr~on: residing or
being in our village: and
"WHEREAS, othrr provisions of thi;; lrgislation may cause such
a reduction in rc,·r1rne to this Yill:1gr that an additional burden may
result from incrrasrd taxation and/or curtailment of services esscmtial to the health, wrlfare and safety of this village; ...
"BE IT ORDAINED BY THE VILLAGE OF [MONROE-

VILLE] OHIO:
"Scrtion 1. That. the sen·ices of the m:rnngement consulting firm
of Midwest Consultants, Inrorporated of Sandusky, Ohio, be employed to rondurt a survey nnd study to nsrertain the extent of the
effects of the County Court Law on lnw enforcement and loss of
revenue in and to the Villnge of [Monroeville], Ohio, Fo that said
Village ran prepare for the future opcr::ilions of the Village to safeguard the hC':tlth [sic], welfare and snfC't:v of its citizens . . . . "
"'.\forp0,·C'r, :\fonror,·illc'~ Chirf of PoliC'e, appointed by 1he l\fa~·or,
Ohio HeY. Code § 737.15. tC'~tifi<'rl thnt it wnF hi~ rcgul:ir pra<'1ire
to rhar~c ~nspert~ un<lrr a Yillagr onlinnnrr·, rathC'r th:111 a st:1te
RlatutC', whrne,·rr a c-hoirC' r.._i,trd. App., at 9. Thnt poliry mu~t
be Yiewcd in light of § 733.40, which pro,·i<les that fines and forfeiturr~ rolkctrd b~· the i\T:t~·or in ~1ntr en,r~ ~h:111 he paid to the
rount~· treasury, wlwrr:1~ finC'~ and forf(•iturc" rollcctcrl in ordinance
and traffic rnsC'~ ~h:dl be paid into tlir muniripal trea.sury. Petiionpr assert~ that the .:ifo~·or ronrcded at tri:il that thiF policy was
cnrrird out undrr 1hr i\1n~·or', ordrr~. Thr rrcord lend8 it~rlf to this
infrrcnre. A11p., nt 10-11.

71---1-96-0PIKION
WARD

11.

VILLAGE OF l\10~HOEVILLE

3

Conceding that "the revenue produced from a mayor's
court provides a substantial portion of a municipality's
funds," the Supreme Court of Ohio held nonetheless that
"such fact does not mean that a mayor's impartiality is
so diminished thereby that he cannot act in a disinterested fashion in a judicial capacity." 27 Ohio St. 2d 185.
271 X E. 2d 761. We disagree with that conclusion.
The issue turns, as the Ohio court acknowledged, on
whether the Mayor can be regarded as an impartial judge
under the principles laid down by this Court in Tum ey
v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1927). There, convictions for
prohibition law violations rendered by the Mayor of
North College Hill , Ohio, were reversed when it appeared
that, in addition to his regular salary, the Mayor received $696.25 from the fees and costs levied by him
against alleged violators. This Court held that " ... it
certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due process of
law, to subject his liberty or property to the judgment
of a court the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion
against him in his case." Id., 523.
The fact that the mayor there shared directly in
the fees and costs did not define the limits of the
principle. Although "the mere union of the executive
power and the judicial power in him cannot be said
to violate due process of law," Id., 534, the test is whether
tho mayor's situation is one ''\Yhich would offer a possible
temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the
burden of proof required to convict the defendant or
which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear
and true between the state and the accused .... " Id.,
532. Plainly that "possible temptation" may also exist
when the mayor's executive responsibilities for village
finances~ cessarlN make him partisan to maintain the
high level of contribution from the mayor's court. This

_(
h

t.

,,

71-496-0PINION
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WARD v. VILLAGE OF MONROEYILLE

too is a "situation in which an official perforce occupies
two practically and seriously inconsistent positions, one
partisan and the other judicial, [andl necessarily involves a lack of due process of law in the trial of defendants charged with crimes before him." Id., 534.
This situation is wholly unlike that in Dugan v. Ohio,
277 U. S. 61 (1928), which the Ohio Supreme Court
deemed controlling lwre. There the Mayor of Xenia,
Ohio, had no executive but only judicial functions. The
city was governed by a commission of five members, including the Mayor, ·which exercised all legislative powers.
A City Manager, together with the Commission, exercised all executive powers. In those circumstances, this
Court held that the Mayor's relation to the finances
and financial policy of the City was too remote to warrant a presumption of bias toward conviction in prosecutions before him as judge.
Respondent urges that Ohio's statutory provision, Ohio
Revised Code ~ 2937.20, for the disqualification of interested, biased or prejudiced judges is a sufficient safeguard
to protect petitioner's rights. This argument is not persuasive. First, it is highly dubious that this provision
was available to raise petitioner's broad challenge to the
mayor's court of this village in respect to all prosecutions
there in which fines may be imposed. The provision is
apparently designed only for objection to a particular
rnayort in a specific case where the circumstances in that
municipality might " ·arrant a finding of prejud'ice in that
case." Village of Monroeville v. Ward, 27 Ohio St. 2d
179,184,271 N. E. 2d 757, 760 (1971) (emphasis added).
If this means that an accused must show special prejudice
in his particular case, the statute requires too much and
protects too little. But even if petitioner might have
utilized the procedure to make his objection, the Ohio
Supreme Court passed upon his constitutional contention despite petitioner's failure to invoke the procedure.

71-496-0PINION

WARD v. YILLAGB OF MONROEVILLE

5

In that circumstance, see Henry v. M 'ississippi, 379 U. S.
443 ( 1965), he may be heard in this Court to urge that
the Ohio Supreme Court erred in holding that he had
not established his Fourteenth Amendment claim.
Respondent also argues that any unfairness at the
trial level can be corrected on appeal and trial de novo
in the County Court of Common Pleas. We disagree.
This "procedural safeguard" does not guarantee a fair
trial in the mayor's court; there is nothing to suggest that
the incentive to convict would be diminished by the possibility of reversal on appeal. Nor in any event may the
State's trial court procedure be deemed constitutionally
acceptable simply because the State eventually offers a
defendant an impartial adjudication. Petitioner is entitled to an impartial judge in the first instance. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio is
reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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Pursuant to Ohio Revised Code § 1905.01 et seq., which
authorizes mayors to sit as judges in cases of ordinance
violations and certain traffic offenses, the Mayor of
Monroeville, Ohio, convicted petitioner of two traffic
offenses and fined him $50 on each. The Ohio Court of
Appeals for Huron County, 21 Ohio App. 2d 17, 254
N. E. 2d 375 (1969), and the Ohio Supreme Court, 27
Ohio St. 2d 179, 271 N. E. 2d 757 (1971), three justices
dissenting, sustained the conviction, rejecting petitioner's
objection that trial before a mayor who also had responsibilities for revenue production and law enforcement
denied him a trial before a disinterested and impartial
judicial officer as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. We granted certiorari.
404 u. s. 1058 (1972).
The Mayor of Monroeville has wide executive powers
and is the chief conservator of the peace. He is president of the village council, presides at all meetings, votes
in case of a tie, accounts annually to the council respecting
village finances, fills vacancies in village offices and has
general overall supervision of village affairs. A major
part of village income is derived from the fines, forfeitures, costs and fees imposed by him in his mayor's court ..
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Thus in 1964, this income contributed $23,589.50 of
total village revenues of $46,355.38; in 1965 it was
$18,508.95 of $46,752.60; in 1966 in was $16,085 of
$43,585.13; in 1967 it was $20,060.65 of $53,931.43; and
in 1968 it was $23,429.42 of $52,995.95. This revenue
was of such irnporta.nce to the village that when legislation threatened its loss, the village retained a management consultant for advice upon the problem.'
Orrlin::rnre No. 59-9:
"WHERF..AR, the l~islation known as the County Court law
passed by the 102nd General Assembly greatly rrdures the jurisdictional powers of 1\1ayor Courts as of .Tanuary 1, 1960; and
"WHEREAS, such restrictions may place such a hardship upon
law enforcement personnel in this village and surrounding areas as
to en<lllnger the health. welfare and s3fcty of per:;ons residing or
being in our village; and
"WHEREAS, other provisions of thi~ legislation may cause such
a reduction in rev<'nue to this village that an arlditional burden may
result from increased t:na..tion and/or curtailment of sen·ices essential to the health, welfare and safely of this village; ...
"BE IT ORDAI~ED BY THE VILLAGE OF rMONROEVILLE] OHIO:
"Section 1. That the services of the management consulting firm
of Midwest Consultants, Incorporated of Sandusky, Ohio, be employed to condurt 11 sun·ey and stndy to :1scrrtain the extent of the
effects of the County Court Law on law enforcement and loss of
revenue in and to the Village of [Monroeville], Ohio, so that said
Village can prepare for the future operations of the Village to safeguard the health [sic], welfare and R:1fety of its ritizens . . . . "
:!\IorPover, l\fonror,·ille'~ Chirf of Police, appointed b)· the Mayor,
Ohio Re,·. Code § n7.15, tr~tificd that it \\·as his rrgulnr practice
to charge sn.,pcet, undrr a village ordinance, rather th:rn a Rtnte
statute, whene,·cr a rhoice existed. App., at 9. That policy must
be Yicwed in light of § 7;33.40, which prO\·ideH thn I fi11e.; and forfcitmrs rolleetcd b>· tht' ~fo>·or in ~tate ca,eR shall be paid lo the
rount:v trea~ury, \\·hcrcn~ fines :md forf<'illll"<'~ rolk•ctrd in ordill'mce
and trafiic case's Rhall be paid into the municipal trea~ur~·- Pctiioncr as.sert., that the Mayor eonrcclrd nt trial that this policy wa.s
carried out under the l\Iayor'8 on!Pr~. Thr record IC'nds itself to this
inference. App., at 10---11.
1
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Conceding that "the revenue produced from a mayor's
court provides a substantial portion of a municipality's
funds," the Supreme Court of Ohio held nonetheless that
"such fact does not mean that a mayor's impartiality is
so diminished thereby that he cannot act in a disinterested fashion in a judicial capacity." 27 Ohio St. 2d 185,
271 K E. 2d 761. We disagree with that conrlusion.
The issue turns, as the Ohio court acknowledged, on
whether the Mayor can be regarded as an impartial judge
under the principles laid down by this Court in Turney
v. Ohio, 273 F S. 510 (1927). There, convictions for
prohibition law violations rendered by the Mayor of
North College Hill, Ohio, were reversed when it appeared
that, in addition to his regular salary, the Mayor received $696.25 from the fees and costs levied by him
against alleged violators. This Court held that " ... it
certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and deprives a defendant in a criminal case of clue process of
law, to subject his liberty or property to the judgment
of a court the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion
against him in his case." Id., 523.
The fact that the mayor there shared directly in
tho fees and costs did not define the limits of the
pri11ciple. Although "the mere union of the executive
power and the judicial power in him cannot be said
to violate due process of law." Id., 534, thr test is whether
tho mayor's situation is one "which "·oukl offer a possible
temptation to tho average man as a judge to forget the
burden of proof required to convict the defendant or
which might lead him not to hold tho balance nice., clear
and true between the state and the accused .... " Id.,
532. Plainly that "possible temptation" may also exist
when the mayor's executive responsibilities for village
finances may make him partisan to maintain the high
level of contribution from. the mayor's court. This too
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is a "situation in which an official perforce occupies
two practically and seriously inconsistent positions, one
partisan and the other judicial, [and] necessarily involves a lack of due process of law in the trial of defendants charged with crimes before him." Id., 534.
This situation is wholly unlike that in Dugan v. Ohio,.
277 U. S. 61 (1928) , which the Ohio Supreme Court
deemed controlling here. There the Mayor of Xenia,
Ohio, had judicial functions but only very limited executive authority. The city was governed by a commission
of five members, including the Mayor, which exercised
all legislative powers. A City Manager, together with
the Commission, exercised all executive powers. In those·
circumstances, this Court held that the Mayor's relation
to the finances and financial policy of the City was too
remote to warrant a presumption of bias toward conviction in prosecutions before him as judge.
Respondent urges that Ohio's statutory provision, Ohio
Revised Code § 2937.20, for the disqualification of interested, biased or prejudiced judges is a sufficient safeguard
to protect petitioner's rights. This argument is not persuasive. First, it is highly dubious that this provision
was available to raise petitioner's broad challenge to the
mayor's court of this village in respect to all prosecutions
there in which fines may be imposed. The provision is
apparently designed only for objection to a particular
mayor "in a specific case where the circumstances in that
municipality might warrant a finding of prejudice in that
case." Village of Monro eville v. Ward, 27 Ohio St. 2d
179, 184, 271 N. E. 2d 757, 760 (1971) (emphasis added).
If this means that an accused must sho,v special prejudice
in his particular case, the statute requires too much and
protects too little. But even if petitioner might have
utilized the procedure to make his objection, the Ohio
Supreme Court passed upon his constitutional contention despite petitioner's failure to invoke the procedure.
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In that circumstance, see Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U. S.
443 ( 1965), he may be heard in this Court to urge that
the Ohio Supreme Court erred in holding that he had
not established his Fourteenth Amendment claim.
Respondent also argues that any unfairness at the·
trial level can be corrected on appeal and trial de nova
in the County Court of Common Pleas. We disagree.
This "procedural safeguard" does not guarantee a fairtrial in the mayor's court; there is nothing to suggest that
the incentive to convict would be diminished by the possibility of reversal on appeal. Nor in any event may theState's trial court procedure be deemed constitutionally
acceptable simply because the State eventually offers a
defendant an impartial adjudication. Petitioner is entitled to a neutral and detached judge in the first instance.2 Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Ohio is reversed and the case is remanded for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered..

The question presented on this record is the conslitutionality of
the Mayor's participation in the adjudication and punishment of a
defendant in a litigated case where he elects to contest the charges
ngain~t him. We intimcltc no view that it would be unconstitutional
to permit a mayor or similar official to serve in essentially a ministerial cclpacity in a traffic or ordinance violation case to accept a
free and voluntary plen of guilty or nolo contendel'e, a forfeiture of
collateral, or the like.
2
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The Mayor of Monroeville, Ohio, found petitioner
guilty o ~ traffic offenses and fined him $50 on each.
Tho Mayor sat as .1uclgc pursuant to Ohio Revised Code
1D03.01 et seq. \\"hich authorizrs '.\fayors of Ohio municipalitirs to do so in casrs of ordinance violation and
certain traffic offe11;e:rs. The Ohio Cotirt of Appeals of
Uuron County, 21 Ohio App. 2d 17, 254 N. E. 2d 375
( Hl6fl) , and thr Ohio Supreme Court, 27 Ohio St. 2d 179.
271 X. E. 2d 757 (Hl71), sustained the conviction. Those
courts rejectrd petitioner's contention that trial brfore a
~'vfayor ~d10 also had rrsponsibilities for rrvenue )rod uction and la"· en orccment c rnied him a trial before
~~stecTancl impartia1 judiciaTofficer as guaranteed
hy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amrndment.
Tho Mayor of Monroeville has "·ide executive 1)0\\'0rs
and is the chief conservator of the peace. Ile is president of the village council , presides at all meetings, votes
in case of a tic, accounts anually to the council ro'-pocting
village finances, fills vacancies in village offices and has
general overall supervision of village affairs. A major
part of village income is derived from the fines, forfeitures, costs and fees nnposod15y !urn 111 his Mayor's
r lUS in 1964. this income contrffrntecl $23,580.5-() -of
total village revenues of $46,3i55.38; in HJ65 it was
$18,508.95 of $46.752.GO; in Hl66 in \\"as $16,085 of
$43,58.:5.13; in 1967 it mis $20,060.65 of $53,931.43; and
in 1968 it was $23,429.42 of $52,995.95. This revenue
,ms of such importance to tho village that \\'hen legislation threatened its loss, the village retained a managePER
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mcnt consultant for advice upon the problem.~· The
Ohio Suprernc Court held that " . . . even though the
revenue proclucC'd from a mayor's court provides a substantial portion of a rnunicipality's funclia:, such fact doc
not mean that a mayor's impartiality is so diminished
tliC'reby that he cannot act in a clisintcre::;tcd fashion i11
a judicial capacity." 27 Ohio St. 2d - , 271 ~. E. 2d

l

\Ye disagree with the Ohio Supreme Court. That
court arKno\\·lcdged that the lSSUC turns 011 whether the
::vlayor can bC' regarded as an impartial juclgC' under the
principlC's laid clom1 by this Court in Tumey v. Ohio,
273 C S. 510 (1027). There convictions for prohibition
law Yiolations rC'll(lrrecl by the Mayor of North College
Hill, Ohio, WC're reversed when it appeared that, in addition to his rC'gular 1-alary, the Mayor received $696.25
from the frC's and costs levied by him against alleged
viola.tors. This Court held ". . . it certainly violates
thC' Fourteenth ArnC'nclmcnt, and deprives a cldendant
in a criminal case of clue process of la"·· to subject his
•:·Ordinanrr No. 59- 9:
"WHEREAS . 1hr lcgi~lalion knmrn as thr Counl~· Court law
p:1~;,rd b:v thr 102nd Grnrrnl A~~rmhJ~, grratJ~, rrclurr, the jurisclic1ional power,; of :i\f:1~·or Court8 :i s of Januar~· 1. 1960 ; :rnd
"\YllEREAS , St1<'h rr~trirtions ma~· place surh a hnrd~hip upon
law rnforermrnt prr,onnd in thi,; village :md RlllT01111cling arrfls a~
to rncbngrr thr hralth, \\·rlfnrr and ~afrly of prr~ons residing or
bring in om vill:1gr; and
"WITEREAS , othrr provi~ions of t hi~ lrgislnt ion m:iy rauRc snrh
a rrdurtion in rr,·rnur to this Yillagr that an additional burden m:iy
mmlt from inrrcnsrd t:1xation and / or rurt:1ilmrnt of srrvicrR r~sC'ntial to the health, wrlfarr and ~flf{'(y of this dingo ; . . .
"BE IT ORDAnED BY THE YILLAGE m [".\TONROE\'ILLE] OIIIO:
"Section 1. Thnt thr ~rn·irr,; of the mflnflgrmrnt ronRulting firm
of Midwest Con~ul1nntR, Inrorporntcd of Randu~ky, Ohio, be rmplo~·cd to rondurt fl Run·ry and study to ascrrtnin the extent of thC'
rtTrrt ,; of thr Count)· Court Law on In,,· rnforermrnt nncl lo~s of
ronnne in and to 1hr Village of [Monroeville] , Ohio, so that sflid
Yillngr rfln prrparr for tho future operations of the Village to safcgu;ird tho health [sic] , wclfarr and snfrty of its citizens .... "
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liberty or property to the judgment of a court the judge
of which has a direct, g£!J9JJ_al, substantial pecuniary
interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case."
Id., 523. But the fact that the Mayor there shared directly in the fees and costs did not define the limits of
the principle. Although "the mere union of the executive power and the judicial power in him cannot be said
to violate due process of law," Id., 534, the test is whether
the Mayor's situation is one "which would offer a possible
temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the
burden of proof required to convict the defendant or
"·hich might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear
and true between the state and the accused .... " Id.,
532. Plainly that "possible temptation" may also exist
when the Mayor's executive responsibilities for village
finances necessarily make him partisan to maintain the
high level of contribution from the Mayor's court. This
too is a "situation in which an official perforce occupies
two practically and seriously inconsistent positions, one
partisan and the other judicial, [and] necessarily involves a lack of due process of law in the trial of defendants charged with crimes before him." Id., 534.
This situation is wholly unlike that in Dugan v. Ohio,
277 U. S. 61 (1928), which the Ohio Supreme Court
deemed controlling here. There the Mayor of Xerna,
Ohio, had no executive but only judicial functions. The
city was governed by a commission which exercised all
legislative powers. A City Manager, together with the
Commission, exercised all executive powers. In these
circumstances, this Court held that the Mayor's relation
to the finances and financial policy of the City was too
remote to warrant a presumption of bias tm-vard conviction in prosecutions before him as judge.
Respondent urges that Ohio's statutory provision, Ohio
Revised Code 733.24, for the disqualification of interested,
biased or prejudiced judges is a sufficient safeguard to
protect petitioner's rights. This argument is not persuasive. First, it is highly dubious that this provision
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,ms available to raise petitioner's broad challenge to the
Mayor's court of this village in respect of all prosecutions
there in which fines may be imposed. The provision is
apparently designed only for objections to a particular
mayor "in a specific case where the circumstances in that
municipality warrant a finding of prejudice in thal case."
\'illage of M omoeville v. TVard, 21 Ohio App. 2d 17, 254
N. E. 2d 375, (Hl71) (emphasis added). If this
means that an accused must show special prejudice in
his particular case, the statute requires too much and
protects too little. But even if petitioner might have
utilized the procedure to make his objection, the Ohio
Supreme Court passed upon his constitutional contention despite petitioner's failure to invoke the procedure.
In that circumstance, see Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U. S.
443 ( 1965), he may be heard in this Court to urge that
the Ohio Supreme Court erred in holding that he had
not established his Fourteenth Amendment claim.
Respondent also argues that any unfairness at the
trial level can be corrected on appeal and trial de nova
in the County Court of Common Pleas. We disagree.
Apart from the fact that Tuniey was decided despite
the availability of some review, when that case was
decided, 273 U. S., at 517, certainly this "procedural
safeguard" docs not guarantee a fair trial in the
mayor's court; there is nothing to suggest that the
incentive to convict would be diminished by the possibility of reversal on appeal. Nor in any event may the
State's trial court procedure be deemed constitutionally
acceptable simply because the State eventually offers a
defendant an impartial adjudication. Petitioner is entitled to a fair trial and an impartial judge in the first
instance; the State may not erect formidable procedural
barriers which require a defendant either to accept an
unjust punishment or to relegate himself to the delay
and expense of appeal.
The petition for certiorari is granted and the judgment
of the Supreme Court of Ohio is
Reversed.
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